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Over the past three decades, the agricultural biotechnology sector has been characterized by rapid 
innovation, market consolidation, and a more exhaustive definition of property rights. The industry 
attributes  consistently  identified  by  the  literature  and  important  to  this  analysis  include:  (i) 
endogenous sunk costs in the form of expenditures on R&D; (ii) seed and agricultural chemical 
technologies that potentially act as complements within firms and substitutes across firms; and (iii) 
property rights governing plant and seed varieties that have become more clearly defined since the 
1970s. This paper adds to the stylized facts of the agricultural biotechnology industry to include the 
ability  of  firms  to  license  technology,  a  phenomenon  observed  only  recently  in  the  market  as 
licensing was previously precluded by high transactions costs and “anti-stacking” provisions. We 
extend  Sutton‟s  theoretical  framework  of  endogenous  sunk  costs  and  market  structure  to 
incorporate the ability of firms to license technology under well-defined property rights, an observed 
characteristic not captured in previous analyses of the sector. Our model implies that technology 
licensing leads to lower levels of industry concentration then what would be found under Sutton‟s 
model, but that industry concentration remains bounded away from perfect competition as market 
size becomes large.  
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I.  Introduction 
Over the past three decades, the agricultural biotechnology sector has been characterized by rapid 
innovation,  market  consolidation,  and  a  more  exhaustive  definition  of  property  rights. 
Concentration has occurred in both firm and patent ownership with the six-firm concentration 
ratios  in  patents  reaching  approximately  50%  in  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K.  (Harhoff,  et  al.,  2001) 
However, increased concentration has had ambiguous effects on R&D investment as the ratio of 
R&D expenditure to industry sales, 71.4%, remains relatively large. (Lavoie, 2004) Based upon the 
observed industry and patent ownership consolidation in the sector, Sheldon (2008) discusses the 
potential application of Sutton‟s “bounds” approach to the agricultural biotechnology industry and 
finds  stylized  facts  that  an  exogenous  technological  shock  led  to  an  increase  in  both  R&D 
expenditure  and the  number of innovating  firms.  We  extend  Sutton‟s theoretical  framework  of 
endogenous sunk costs and market structure to incorporate the ability of firms to license technology 
under well-defined property rights, an observed characteristic not captured in previous analyses of 
the  sector.  Our  model  implies  that  technology  licensing  leads  to  lower  levels  of  industry 
concentration then what would be found under Sutton‟s model, but that industry concentration 
remains bounded away from perfect competition as market size becomes large. 
The  industry  attributes  consistently  identified  by  the  literature  and  important  in  the 
development of an endogenous market structure model include: (i) endogenous sunk costs in the 
form of expenditures on R&D; (ii) seed and agricultural chemical technologies that potentially act as 
complements within firms and substitutes across firms; and (iii) property rights governing plant and 
seed varieties that have become more clearly defined since the 1970s. Moreover, this paper adds to the 
stylized  facts  of  the  agricultural  biotechnology  industry  to  include  the  ability  of  firms  to  license 
technology, a phenomenon observed only recently in the market as licensing was previously precluded 2 
 
by high transactions costs and “anti-stacking” provisions.
1 We posit that complementarities between 
intellectual property assets and, to a certain extent, an increased willingness-to-pay and/or size of the 
market for agricultural biotechnology led to firm consolidation. The endogeneity of sunk cost R&D 
expenditure and consolidation of firms in agricultural biotechnology allowed the remaining firms to 
realize economies of scope in production and escalate their R&D expenditures. 
Rapid technological innovation and observed firm consolidation has led to several empirical 
examinations  of  market  structure  in  the  agricultural  biotechnology  industry.  Previous  work  has 
tested Schumpeterian hypotheses regarding the levels of industry concentration and innovation in 
biotechnology (Schimmelpfennig, Pray, and Brennan, 2004), assessed the role of complementary 
intellectual assets in merger and acquisition activity to diversify intellectual asset portfolios under 
significant transaction costs (Graff, Rausser, and Small, 2003), and analyzed patent rights in industry 
consolidation  (Marco  and  Rausser,  2008).  Additional  stylized  examinations  of  the  agricultural 
biotechnology  industry  have  identified  an  endogenous,  cyclical  relationship  between  industry 
concentration  and  R&D  intensity  (Oehmke,  Wolf,  and  Raper,  2005),  classified  the  firm 
characteristics  and  strategic  incentives  that  affect  the  form  of  consolidation  (Johnson  and 
Melkonyan, 2003), and categorized the endogenous relationship between firm innovation strategies, 
including the role of complementary intellectual assets, and industry consolidation characteristics 
(Kalaitzandonakes and Bjornson, 1997). Empirical examinations have also identified economies of 
scope in firm R&D activity as well as the presence of both internal and external spillovers in R&D 
(Chen, Naseem, and Pray, 2004). 
Relative to the current literature in agricultural biotechnology, our model is most closely 
related to the work of Shi (2009), Johnson and Melkonyan (2003), Goodhue, et al. (2002), and 
                                                           
1 “Anti-stacking” in this context refers to contractual provisions, specified by the licensor of intellectual assets, which 
preclude licensee firms from incorporating  multiple genetic traits from competitor firms into a single seed variety. 
(Graff, Rausser, and Small, 2003) 3 
 
Kalaitzandonakes  and  Marks  (2000)  in  its  analysis  of  the  choice  of  coordination  strategy  of 
intellectual  property  assets.  Within  a  product  life-cycle  framework  with  uncertainty  over  the 
valuation of technical assets, Kalaitzandonakes and Marks (2000) argue for licensing arrangements 
with  greater  flexibility,  rather  than  simple  maximization  of  income  streams  based  upon  a 
comparative case study in agricultural biotechnology. Goodhue, et al. (2002) examine firm incentives 
to  consolidate  via  mergers  and  acquisitions  compared  to  exclusive  and  non-exclusive  license 
agreements under differing intellectual property regimes given the nature of the product system. 
Building upon the model of Aghion and Tirole (1994), Johnson and Melkonyan (2003) find that 
choice  of  ownership  structure  and  levels  of  R&D  investment  depend  primarily  upon  the 
substitutability (complementarity) of assets across firms and/or the specificity of R&D investments. 
Adapting  a  Hotelling‟s  spatial  differentiation  model  and  bundling  theory  to  a  game  theoretic 
framework  with  farmer  adoption  decision,  Shi  (2009)  finds  incentives  of  firms  to  differentially 
integrate or license their technology depending upon whether genes are substitutes or complements. 
Thus  far,  the  empirical  examinations  in  agricultural  biotechnology  have  primarily  focused  upon 
levels of firm concentration and innovation activity measured via patent ownership, industry sales 
ratios, and field trial applications. With the exception of the comparative simulations of Johnson and 
Melkonyan  (2003)  and  the  stylized  descriptions  of  Kalaitzanodakes  and  Bjornson  (1997),  little 
empirical attention has been paid to the differing mechanisms of firm consolidation in agricultural 
biotechnology. According to data on the four largest agricultural biotechnology firms reported by 
Johnson and Melkonyan (2003), nonexclusive and exclusive license agreements comprised nearly 
half (42 of 90) of the observed consolidation activities in the sector. Moreover, the collaborative 
agreements collected by Kalaitzanodakes and Bjornson (1997) imply that mergers and acquisitions, 
licensing,  distribution,  and  production  agreements  became  increasingly  important  in  agricultural 
biotechnology relative to equity investments, R&D agreements, and joint ventures. Thus, a more 4 
 
rigorous examination of the nature of collaborative agreements in agricultural biotechnology under 
more clearly defined property rights is warranted, especially considering the role of licensing upon 
incentives for firms to innovate. 
We extend Sutton‟s “capabilities” framework relating endogenous sunk costs and market 
structure to allow firms to consolidate via licensing and cross-licensing agreements. First, we present 
an illustrative example of the effect of licensing upon innovation and market structure in a quantity-
quality choice framework under a Cournot duopoly. In these simulations, we find that there are 
incentives for low cost incumbent firms to license their (higher) level of technology to potential 
entrants even if firms compete along a single capability/quality and goods differentiated substitutes. 
Subsequently, we discuss Sutton‟s model and present our extensions as well as predictions on the 
effect of the ability of firms to license their technology upon market structure and innovation. In the 
final section we discuss the implications and conclude. 
 
II.  Illustrative Example: Quality Choice in a Duopoly Model with Licensing 
To illustrate the affect of the ability of firms to license product quality upon their incentives to 
innovate, we examine a simple two-stage game between firms with asymmetric returns to R&D that 
offer products differentiated by characteristics and quality. After determining the quantity/quality 
choices of firms in such a setting, we then incorporate the ability of firms engage in cross-product 
licensing agreements with their competitors and observe how the quantity/quality choices differ 
under licensing. Our primary concern is in determining the quality choices offered by each firm, 
which embeds the market entry decision, as well as the effects upon firm profit and consumer 
welfare as the timing of the entry decision and the cost elasticities of the firms vary. 
We  find  that incumbent  firms only offer license  arrangements when facing  a „low‟ cost 
elasticity and the product market is relatively differentiated (low degree of substitution). Licensing is 5 
 
never profitable in cases in which the cost elasticity on R&D expenditure is relatively „high‟ for the 
incumbent, given the minimum setup cost, or if the goods are homogenous. The higher quality 
offerings under licensing are associated with higher incumbent and entrant firm profits as well as 
greater consumer utility under our linear demand example. 
Consider  the  case  of  a  single  consumer  and  two  firms,  indexed  by     and   ,  that  make 
deterministic  investments  in  product  quality,         ,  in  the  first  stage  and  then  compete  in 
quantities,        , in the second stage. The information environment is such that product qualities 
are realized at the end of the first stage and are common knowledge to both firms as well as the 
consumer,  regardless  of  the  timing  of  actions  in  the  first  stage.  Such  an  assumption  simplifies 
potential concerns regarding asymmetric information that could arise in the second stage as well as 
provides some realism to the game in which introductions of new products can be divided into a 
development/design phase and production phase (Aoki and Prusa, 1996). 
We assume in this simple case that the firms each offer a single good and face a consumer 
with a linear demand utility function in which the goods are indexed by their qualities such that 
consumer willingness-to-pay is increasing in product quality up to some maximum amount. The 
linear demand function thus takes the form: 














                    
where   is the utility that the consumer receives from consuming all outside goods and   is the 
parameter that captures the degree that the two goods are substitutes             and embeds the 
case in which the two goods are offered in independent submarkets (i.e.      ).
2 The consumer‟s 
individual inverse-demand schedule for each good   is: 
                                                           
2 In the most general cases, this parameter can take any values between negative one and one (i.e.          ) such that 
any values less than zero captures the degree that the two goods are complements. Our assumption that goods are either 6 
 
        
   
  
      
  
    
               
As Sutton identifies, as the quality for any good   approaches zero         , the demand for that 
good falls to zero for any nonnegative price. 
The results thus far have been derived solely from consumer demand and are independent 
of the structure and timing of the quality-quantity choices by the firms. In the remainder of the 
illustrative  example,  we  assume  zero  marginal  costs  in  production  such  that  firms  compete  in 
quantities in the second stage taking their own quality and competitor quality as given. Thus, Firm   
maximizes revenue such that: 
   
  
        
  
           
  
    
   
  
      
  
    
                  
Solving the first-order conditions yields the following reaction functions: 
  










                  
Substituting in the reaction function for the other firm and solving yields the Cournot equilibrium 
quantities for both firms as functions for the quality choice by each firm in the first stage. The 
optimal quantities can thus be expressed as: 
  




   
         
                       
It can be observed that if goods are substitutes, then the amount of Firm  ‟s good demanded is 
increasing in own quality (i.e. 
   
 
   
  ) only if the quality they offer is greater than or equal to a 
proportion of their competitor‟s quality offered, namely 
   
  . Additionally, the quantity demanded for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
independent or substitutes is plausible in this illustrative example as we are limiting the market to only two goods. In the 
more general case, we relax this assumption to allow for demand-side complementarities which is consistent with an 
industry such as agricultural biotechnology in which greater utility can be derived from the final-stage consumption of 
complementary products such as between a herbicide-tolerant seed variety and a specific herbicide. 7 
 
Firm   is decreasing in the quality offered by their competitors (i.e. 
   
 
   
  ). The revenue function for 
Firm   can be written as: 
  




         
        
 
               
If the goods offered by the two firms are substitutes, then Firm  ‟s revenue is non-decreasing (i.e. 
   
 
   
  ) in own quality only if the quality they offer is greater than or equal to a proportion of their 
competitors quality, namely 
   
  , and is also  non-increasing (i.e. 
   
 
   
  ) in the quality offered by their 
competitors.
3 
The previous results hold regardless of the timing of quality choices (i.e. irretrievable R& D 
investment decisions) in the first stage. The profit function that firms maximize in choosing the 
quality that they offer is equivalent to the revenue function net of the fixed costs associated with 
attaining quality   . This cost function can be specified as consisting of a fixed setup cost that all 
firms must pay in order to enter a particular trajectory    as well as an additional cost parameter that 
is strictly increasing in quality by an elasticity equal to   . We assume that there is a minimum level of 
quality associated with entry              and that the elasticity of the fixed cost schedule increases 
with quality at least as rapidly as firm profit         . Thus, the fixed cost schedule for Firm   can be 
specified as: 
                               
such that Firm   maximizes the profit function: 
   
                                             
                                                           
3 It is interesting to note that if the goods are complements             , then the quantity demanded for Firm  ‟s 
good is always increasing in both their own and competitor‟s quality (i.e. 
   
 
   
     
   
 
   
  ). Additionally, the revenue of Firm 
  is always increasing in own and other firm quality (i.e. 
   
 
   
     
   
 
   
  ). 8 
 
or explicitly: 
   




         
        
 
                         
Each firm maximizes profit by choosing own quality    taking other firm quality as given. Moreover, 
as quality-choice is constrained in the maximization problem to allow for both a minimum quality 
level as well as non-entry (i.e.       ),  the first-order complementary slackness conditions can be 
specified as: 
    
            
                  
    
                     
Thus, for cases in which there exists an interior solution with quality choices that are greater than or 
equal to one, the solution to the optimal quality choice reaction functions is a non-linear function 
such that   
  satisfies: 
   
                          
     
                   
In order to further analyze the illustrative example on quality-quantity choice in a duopoly, we first 
set  a  value  for  the  minimum  setup  cost  at  which  firms  will  always  find  it  optimal  to  choose 
minimum quality compared to inactivity, given that the other firm is producing at minimum quality. 
This assumption precludes the possibility that the setup cost is prohibitively expensive such that 
only  a  single,  minimum  quality  firm  is  sustainable  in  equilibrium.  This  implicitly  excludes  the 
possibility that there exists a natural monopoly in which the monopolist produces at a minimum 
level of quality. However, it does not exclude the possibility that a monopolist producing high 
quality can be sustained in equilibrium. 
Assuming Firm   is producing at minimum quality (i.e.       ), for all feasible values of 
         , and independent of the cost parameter   , we find that it will be profitable for Firm   to 
produce at minimum quality, versus inactivity, if the minimum setup cost    is less than or equal to 9 
 
 
  . This condition arises directly from the profit function  Eq.     for Firm   such that for any 
minimum setup cost     
 
  , firms will find it (weakly) preferable to produce at minimum quality 
compared  to  remaining  inactive.  Although  this  parameterization  may  appear  to  be  somewhat 
innocuous as all firms face the same setup cost, it will become a factor into subsequent analysis 
when we compare the incentives of firms to select own R&D expenditures versus licensing the 
technology from other firms. 
In order to get a clearer understanding of the tradeoff between sunk cost investment, the quality 
offered by firms, and firm profitability, we solve the illustrative example assuming that firms face an 
exogenously determined elasticity of the fixed-cost R&D schedule that take a value that is either 
„high‟ or „low‟ cost. Until this point, we have placed only a single, theoretical assumption on the cost 
parameter, namely      . To determine possible candidate values, we first solve the case in which 
firms offer products in independent submarkets (i.e.      ), such that own quality choice does not 
affect, and in turn is unaffected by, the quality choice of the other firm. 
Firm   chooses quality according to equation  Eq.     such that: 







     
 
 
    
 
    
          
 
 
         
 
 
                 
and the profit for Firm   can be expressed as: 
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For „large‟ values of the cost parameter, specifically for     
 
 , the firm will always find it optimal to 
choose minimum quality,        , and earn a positive profit of 
 
  . Moreover, these results imply that 
if the goods are offered are in independent submarkets, inactivity,       , is strictly dominated by 
choosing minimum quality,       . As    
 
  is the infimum of the set of „large‟ values for the cost 
parameter such that it is optimal for firms to offer minimal quality in independent submarkets, we 
use this value to parameterize the „high‟ cost value in the illustrative example and set        as the 
„low‟ cost value as it satisfies the only assumption we have thus far made over the cost parameter 
(i.e.      ). 
In the analysis of the first-stage quality choice games that follow, we are primary concerned with 
examining how the quality choice of each firm changes as we change: (i) the framework and timing 
of the  first-stage  quality choice game; (ii) firms face either symmetric cost elasticities or a cost 
(dis)advantage relative to the other firm; and (iii) the parameter over the degree to which the goods 
are substitutes. The three frameworks on the timing of the first-stage quality choice that we are 
interested in are: (i) simultaneous quality choice; (ii) sequential quality choice in which Firm   has 
„first-mover‟ advantage in choosing their own quality; and (iii) a sequential quality choice framework 
in which Firm   has a „first-mover‟ advantage and can offer a licensing agreement over their chosen 
level of quality. In this final framework, Firm   chooses either their own optimal level of quality via 
expenditure on their own sunk cost R&D or the level of quality offered by Firm   in the licensing 
agreement. For each of the first-stage quality choice games, we examine four cases for the possible 
cost parameters faced by each firm. There are two cases in which firms face symmetric elasticities of 
the  fixed-cost  schedule  (low/low  and  high/high)  as  well  as  two  cases  in  which  the  firms  face 
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A.  Simultaneous Quality Choice 
In the first quality choice framework, the two firms choose their level of quality simultaneously 
given the cost parameters for each firm as well as an exogenously determined degree of substitution 
between  the  goods.  The  firms  solve  nonlinear  reaction  functions  to  determine  optimal  quality 
conditional on this level of quality being greater than or equal to the minimum level and that each 
firm earns non-negative profits given the other firm‟s level of quality. Thus, we have a system of two 
nonlinear root-finding equations in two unknown quality variables such that: 
                            
    
    
                            
    
                   
subject to                        
           
The results on both quality and firm profit under the simultaneous quality choice framework are 
illustrated graphically in Figures 1 and 2 for the four possible cost regimes as a function of the 
degree of substitution between goods in the product market. 
 
For the case in which both firms have „low‟ cost parameters (           ), there exists an interior 
solution in which firms choose symmetric quality levels that are greater than the minimum quality 
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when the two goods have a „low‟ to „moderate‟ degree of substitution (i.e.        
 
  ). As the degree 
of substitution between the two goods increases, the symmetric outcome with quality greater than 
the minimum does not satisfy the non-negative profit condition. Moreover, the collusive outcome in 
which both firms produce at minimum quality cannot be sustained in equilibrium as both firms have 
incentive to deviate and increase quality. Thus, for a „high‟ degree of substitution (i.e.      
 
    ), 
there exist only corner solutions in which one firm offers the „monopolistic‟ level of quality, in our 
case this is equivalent to     
 
  for the given values of the cost parameter and minimum setup cost, 
and the other firms remain inactive as well as the trivial case in which both firms choose inactivity. 
For the case in which the two firms face asymmetric costs of R&D expenditure (i.e.     
        
 
  or     
 
          ), the best response for a firm that is at a cost disadvantage is to 
produce minimum quality for any „low‟ values on the substitution parameter (i.e.        
 
  ) and to 
remain  inactive  for  any  value  of  the  substitution  parameter  that  is  greater  than  one-half. 
Correspondingly, the firm with the cost advantage chooses a quality greater than the minimum level 
to solve the nonlinear reaction function given the other firm will be producing minimum quality for 
       
 
   and will choose the „monopolistic‟ level of quality, here     
 
 , for all values of the degree 
of substitution greater than one-half. 
When both firms face a „high‟ cost parameter (         
 
 ), the best response for each firm 
regardless of the value of the substitution parameter is to produce minimum quality. Both firms earn 
profits strictly greater than zero in this symmetric equilibrium except under the case in which the 
two  goods  are  perfect  substitutes  on  the  demand  side,       ,  and  profits  are  equal  to  zero. 
Moreover, neither firm has incentive to deviate and increase their quality offered as profits under 
any positive deviation are strictly less than zero. 14 
 
B.  Sequential Quality Choice 
Suppose that firms choose quality sequentially such that Firm   selects quality    first and can thus 
be considered an „incumbent firm‟ whereas Firm   chooses quality    second as an „entrant‟ firm. 
Hence, Firm   maximizes profit by choosing their own quality under the constraint that Firm   
responds optimally after quality    is determined. Firm   ‟s decision on quality level can be effectively 
narrowed down to a choice between offering a „monopolistic‟ level of quality at which Firm    would 
earn a non-positive profit from a choice of minimum quality, offering an „optimal‟ level of quality at 
which Firm    selects a profit maximizing quality level, offering a level of quality at which Firm    
cannot profitably enter the market, and choosing inactivity. 
The „monopolistic‟ level of quality offered is equivalent to the level of quality chosen under 
independent submarkets, namely: 








       
 
 
      
 
    
          
 
 
         
 
 
                 
If the firm faces a „low‟ cost parameter,       , the „monopolistic‟ level of quality is    
  
 
 , whereas if 
the firm has a „high‟ cost parameter,     
 
 , then this quality level falls to the minimum,    
    . 
The „optimal‟ level of quality offered is determined by maximizing Firm   ‟s profit subject to a 
constraint derived from the reaction function from Firm   . Firm    chooses both quality levels,    
  and    
 , 
to maximize the problem: 
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Solving for the first-order conditions under a binding reaction function, we obtain a system of two 
nonlinear root-finding equations in the two unknown quality variables. Specifically, 
                           
                                              
                                      
                             
        
   
                  
                                 
          
The level of quality at which Firm    can successfully preclude Firm    from entering is obtained by 
solving for the level of Firm    quality at which Firm    cannot profitably enter with minimum quality. 
Specifically, Firm    solves for      such that the profit function for Firm    is less than (or equal to) zero if 
Firm    chooses minimum quality. Firm   ‟s problem is to solve for      such that: 




          
        
 
                         
Solving for      yields: 
                      
 
                           
Thus, in the sequential quality choice framework, Firm    chooses          
     
          to maximize own profit 
given the cost parameters for both firms,     and    , and the substitution parameter,  . The results on 
both quality and firm profit under the sequential quality choice framework are illustrated graphically 
in Figures 3 and 4 for the four possible cost regimes as a function of the degree of substitution 
between goods in the product market. 16 
 
   
For the case in which the incumbent firm faces a „low‟ cost elasticity to R&D, there exist three 
possible  quality  choice  regimes  that  govern  the  firm‟s  decision  depending  upon  the  degree  of 
substitution between goods and the cost elasticity to R&D of the potential entrant. The first regime 
holds under „low‟ degrees of substitution between goods such that the incumbent offers a quality 
greater than the minimum and the potential entrant enters with quality greater than the minimum if 
it is also a „low‟ cost firm and equal to the minimum if it is a „high‟ cost firm.  The incumbent firm 
offers a quality level that is lower in the second scenario relative to the first, but also switches to the 
next quality „regime‟ at a lower value of  . 
The second quality regime holds for „intermediate‟ values of the substitution parameter and 
corresponds to the case in which the incumbent firm can successfully prevent entry by increasing 
their own quality offered and the other firm cannot profitably enter. Within the first quality regime, 
the qualities offered, as well as firm profit, are decreasing in the substitution parameter. In this 
second regime, the quality offered continues to decrease from a higher absolute level, but the profit 
for the incumbent is increasing in the substitution parameter. As the potential entrant firm cannot 
profitably enter, it chooses inactivity and earns zero profit. 
The  final  regime,  which  occurs  approximately  for  values  of  the  substitution  parameter 
greater than one-half, consists of the entrant firm offering the „monopolistic‟ level of quality at 
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which profit is maximized and the entrant firm does not find it profitable to enter. This case holds 
regardless of the cost parameter of the potential entrant, although it occurs at a value for   that is 
slightly greater than one-half if the potential entrant is also a „low‟ cost firm. Again, the potential 
entrant firm cannot profitably enter, chooses inactivity, and earns zero profit. 
If the incumbent firm, Firm  , faces a „high‟ parameter value for the elasticity of R&D cost, it 
finds it optimal to produce at minimum quality for all values of   less than one-half, regardless of 
the cost parameter for the potential entrant, Firm  . If Firm   has a „low‟ cost parameter, it enters 
with a quality level greater than the minimum, but if it faces a „high‟ cost parameter it can only 
profitably enter with minimum quality. As   increases from a value in the range between one-half 
and three-fifths, Firm   regains its first-mover advantage as it is successfully able to increase the 
quality of their own good such that Firm   cannot profitably enter by offering minimum quality. 
There is a special case for a relatively small range of values (                 ) in this illustrative 
example, in which the incumbent firm faces a cost disadvantage and cannot profitably remain in the 
market by offering minimum quality. Thus, the entrant chooses to offer the „monopolistic‟ level of 
quality and the incumbent chooses inactivity and earns zero profit. 
 
C.  Sequential Quality Choice under Licensing 
In order to incorporate licensing under sequential quality choice, we assume that incumbent firms 
can license their technology (or quality) to potential entrants who, in turn, choose between the 
licensing  agreement,  expenditure  in  own  R&D,  or  pursuing  both  licensing  and  sunk  R&D 
investment simultaneously.
4 This basic framework is similar to the transactions costs framework 
developed by Arora and Fosfuri (2003) in their modeling of the market for technology, but for our 
                                                           
4 In the duopoly case that we examine in our illustrated example, the incumbent firm always prefers to set a level of 
quality under licensing such that the entrant optimally chooses to forgo own R&D and for the remaining discussion we 
disregard this possibility from the entrant‟s choice set. 18 
 
purposes in this illustrative example, we assume that license arrangements occurs in only a single 
direction from incumbent to entrant, an assumption that is relaxed in the general framework to 
allow for cross-licensing. 
We assume that incumbent firms specify their own level of quality as well as a proportion of 
per-firm profit associated with each license that it grants. For the duopoly case examined here, this 
proportion is relatively large as the gains from entry via licensing by an incumbent, who is able to 
forgo costly R&D expenditure, can be significant. Transactions costs associated with licensing are 
incorporated  in  two  forms:  first,  we  assume  that  the  licensee  incurs  a  fixed,  non-recoupable 
transactions cost    associated with each license contract that the firm undertakes; and second, we 
allow for an imperfect transfer of technology between firms by weighting the licensed quality by a 
„depreciation‟ parameter          . These assumptions allow us to incorporate the ability of firms to 
license their technology and pursue license arrangements with competitors in a manner consistent 
with the endogenous sunk cost and market structure framework of Sutton. 
The incumbent firm, Firm  , solves the following problem by choosing the R&D expenditure of 
each firm as well as the proportion of per-firm profits that it receives for each license granted. The 
first constraint is derived from the reaction function of the entrant firm, Firm  , maximizing its own 
profit  via  the  choice  of  R&D  expenditure.  This  constraint  will  not  be  binding  in  the  duopoly 
example as the incumbent firm will set its own quality as well as the proportion of entrant profit 
such  that  entrant  firms  cannot  profitably  increase  the  quality  level  offered  under  licensing  by 
undertaking their own R&D expenditure. Additionally, a participation constraint is incorporated that 
must be satisfied for entrant firms to choose entry via licensing. It implies that incumbent profit 
under licensing is no less than incumbent profit in the absence of an offered license on quality. 
Thus, the incumbent firm, Firm  , solves the following maximization problem: 19 
 
   




                 
        
 




                 
        
 
                                                   
        
       
 
 
                 
        
 
       
              
                
      
         
         
                
As the incumbent firm will prefer the case in which the entrant does not augment its quality via its 
own R&D expenditure, the incumbent will set its own quality    and the proportion of per-firm 
revenue for each license at a level such that the participation constraint is binding under Firm   
choosing to forgo own R&D expenditure (i.e.       ). Thus, we can solve for the proportion of 
per-firm revenue    from this binding participation constraint such that: 
           
      
          
 
 
                           
From  the  first-order  condition  on        ,  given  the  entrant  firm  accepts  the  license  without 
augmenting quality through their own R&D expenditure (i.e.       ), the quality offered by Firm   
under licensing   
  can be specified as: 
  
     
                     
             
 
 
    
                
Thus, the quality offered by a licensor firm depends only upon their own cost parameter   , the 
degree  of  homogeneity  in  the  product  market   ,  the  fixed  set-up  cost  to  R&D    ,  and  the 
„depreciation‟  of  transferred  technology   .  The  proportion  of  per-firm  profits  that  the  licensor 
extracts  also  depends  upon  the  fixed-fee  transactions  costs  per  license      and  the  „reservation‟ 
profits the firm receives in the absence of licensing. 20 
 
In the two cases in which the incumbent firm is a high-cost firm (i.e.     
 
 ), there is no feasible 
proportion of per-firm profits under which the incumbent firm can offers a license contract that is 
accepted by the entrant and profitably remain in the market. Thus, the incumbent firm does not 
offer a potential entrant a contract over its quality level and these two cases revert to the sequential 
quality choice problem examined in the previous section. Although no license is offered in these 
cases, they do not contradict the story of sunk R&D expenditures and incentives of firms to license 
technology. If the two firms face asymmetric costs to R&D and the potential entrant has a cost 
advantage, an incumbent firm cannot profitably offer a feasible license contract that the entrant firm 
would  prefer  relative  to  pursuing  quality  via  its  own  R&D  expenditures.  If  the  two  firms  are 
symmetric,  high-cost  firms,  the  quality  level  associated  with  a  license  contract  offered  by  the 
incumbent is not significantly greater than the quality that the entrant would choose in the sequential 
framework without licensing. Additionally, as there are no cost advantages to capitalize upon, the 
entrant firm prefers to pursue its own R&D expenditure rather than forgo the proportion of profits 
that a license contract implies are transferred to the licensor firm. 
For the two cases in which the incumbent firm, Firm  , faces a low-cost elasticity to R&D, there is a 
range of feasible values for the degree of substitution in the goods market in which it is profitable 
for both the incumbent to offer a license contract and the entrant is no worse off compared to the 
sequential quality choice framework without licensing, provided that the transactions costs are not 
„too  large‟.  If  there  is  a  „low‟  degree  of  substitution  between  the  goods,  and  regardless  of  the 
entrant‟s elasticity of the cost of R&D, Firm   chooses a quality level that is greater than under the 
sequential framework without licensing and earns profits under licensing that are strictly greater. 
Firm   chooses licensing and also produces a quality greater than under the framework without 
licensing, but the binding participation constraint implies that its level of profits is equivalent to the 
case without licensing. However, as the degree of substitution between the goods increases (i.e. the 21 
 
goods become more homogenous), the incentives for Firm   to license its quality level diminish and 
the Firm   chooses a quality level at which Firm   cannot profitably enter. 
 
D. Discussion 
In  order  to  get  a  more  complete  understanding  of  quality  choice  decisions  across  timing 
frameworks,  we  further  separate  the  analysis  along  the  varying  cost  regimes  and  present  the 
graphical illustrations of these results in Appendix A. Several trends can be identified from graphical 
illustrations  that  will  provide  us  with  some  a  priori  predictions  upon  which  to  formulate  the 
theoretical model. Moreover, we can compute consumer utility from the assumed quality-indexed 
linear demand function in order to determine the welfare effects of varying the firm cost regimes 
and quality choice timing frameworks. Finally, it is interesting to note that in almost all cases as 
goods become more homogenous in the product market, the market generally supports only a single 
firm in equilibrium with the notable exception occurring when firms facing symmetric „high‟ cost 
elasticities to R&D and simultaneous quality choice both enter with minimum quality. 
For the first case in which firms face symmetric, low cost parameters for R&D expenditure, the 
incumbent firm prefers to increase its offered quality and recoup the additional R&D expenditure 
via licensing for low degrees of substitution. Given the setup of the problem, the entrant firm earns 
profits under licensing that are no less than the profits it would receive under the sequential choice 
framework. Additionally, we observe that the level of quality offered by the market leader is (weakly) 
greater  under  sequential  quality  choice  framework,  with  or  without  licensing,  compared  to  the 
simultaneous choice framework. These general results remain unchanged when we alter the cost 
regimes to allow the incumbent firm to have a strict cost advantage with the primary differences 
arising for when the cost disadvantaged firm chooses to remain inactive. 22 
 
For the cases in which the incumbent firm faces a high value for its cost parameter, a license in 
which  the  licensee  transfers  a  proportion  of  its  profits  is  infeasible  and  thus  the  sequential 
framework  with  and  without  licensing  are  equivalent.  In  the  simultaneous,  asymmetric  cost 
framework, the cost disadvantaged firm can only profitably enter with minimum quality for values of 
the  substitution  parameter  less  than  one-half.  However,  in  the  sequential  framework,  the  cost 
disadvantaged incumbent can enter profitably and accommodate the potential entrant for a low 
degree of substitution, exits the market for intermediate values of the substitution parameter, and 
precludes entry by the firm with the cost advantage as the degree of substitution increases. The 
market-leading level of quality offered is greater under the simultaneous framework for all values of 
the substitution parameter except those for which the high cost incumbent exits. There is an easily 
visible correspondence between the offered level of quality and firm profit in this scenario. 
If firms face symmetric, high cost elasticities of R&D expenditure, the optimal choice for both 
firms under a simultaneous quality choice decision is to enter with minimum quality regardless of the 
degree  of  product  homogeneity.  Firm  profits  are  monotonically  decreasing,  but  remain  strictly 
positive  for  all  values  of  the  substitution  parameter,  a  result  that  follows  directly  from  our 
assumption on the minimum setup cost. For the sequential choice with and without licensing, the 
incumbent  firm  accommodates  the  entrant  by  offering  minimum  quality  for  low  degrees  of 
substitution, but precludes entry with increasing profits as the products become greater substitutes. 
The  welfare  implications  of  the  various  cost  regimes  and  timing  frameworks  are  illustrated 
graphically in Figure 5 as we examine consumer utility derived from the assumed linear demand 
function. The results indicate that consumers receive the (weakly) greatest possible utility for almost 
any degree of substitution when low cost incumbents choose accommodate entry via licensing. The 
one  exception  being  a  range  of  values  under  which  symmetric,  low  cost  firms  choose  quality 
simultaneously. Moreover, consumers would prefer firms to choose quality sequentially for lower 23 
 
degrees of substitution; a general rule being consumer utility is no less under sequential choice for 
values of    
 
 . The notable exception to this case occurs when there is a high cost incumbent and 
a low cost entrant and consumers would get greater utility under simultaneous quality choice for 
values of      
 
 . Finally, as products become more homogenous such that the market supports 
only  a  single  firm,  the  level  of  consumer  welfare  converges  across  cost  regimes  and  timing 
frameworks at a level that is less than what is observed if products are differentiated. 
 
 
III.  Theoretical Model: Extending Sutton’s “Capabilities” Approach 
A.  Framework 
As Sheldon (    ) identifies, Sutton‟s (    ,     ,     ) “bounds” approach to the analysis of 
market  structure  and  innovation  is  a  natural  candidate  to  the  examination  of  the  agricultural 
biotechnology sector. The “capabilities” approach considers firm concentration to be a function of 
endogenous  sunk  costs  in  R&D  investment  rather  than  as  being  deterministically  driven  by 
exogenous sunk costs. As the level of firm concentration will affect the incentives to innovate, the 
endogenous sunk cost framework provides the opportunity for some firms to outspend rivals in 
R&D and still profitably recover their sunk cost expenditures. The effectiveness with which firms 
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can successfully recoup their sunk cost outlays depends upon demand side linkages across products, 
supply side economies of scope in R&D expenditure, the patterns of technology and consumer 
preferences, and the nature of price competition. 
Our initial extension to Sutton‟s model considers a very general case in which firms choose a R&D 
program consisting not only of sunk investments along   possible research trajectories, but also 
including the choice of whether to pursue the specific research trajectory via their own R&D or to 
license existing technology from the market leader in the specific trajectory. Consider some industry 
with   submarkets indexed by   such that a quantity of good in submarket   is identified by   . Let 
there be    total (and   active) firms indexed by  . 
Firms choose a R&D program consisting of investment in   potential research trajectories, 
indexed by  . Along each trajectory, firms can achieve some competence (capability)     from one 
of two sources: (i) own R&D competence     and (ii) licensed competence    . A firm chooses 
some value                 along each trajectory where         corresponds to inactivity along 
the  trajectory  and           corresponds  to  a  minimum  level  of  capability.  As  there  may  exist 
economies of scope in R&D and licensing expenditures, there exists a parameter            such 
that  competence  achieved  along  other  trajectories       can  increase  capability  realized  along 
trajectory  . Therefore, capability     can be written as: 
                                   
   
  
where           is a parameter that captures (imperfect) substitution of licensed competence. Thus, 
overall  capability  that  a  firm  achieves  along  any  specific  trajectory  is  a  function  of  own  R&D 
investment along the trajectory, licensed investment along the trajectory, and a discounted sum of 
investment along all other trajectories. 25 
 
There exists a sunk (fixed) cost                    associated with R&D expenditure along with 
trajectory   where    is a (minimum) setup cost and the elasticity of the fixed cost schedule is 
characterized  by  the  parameter        ,  which  can  vary  across  firms  so  as  to  incorporate  the 
possibility that incumbent and entrant firms face asymmetric cost schedules. Moreover, there exists 
a sunk (fixed) cost                    associated with licensed expenditure along the trajectory   
where    is a (fixed) transaction cost incurred by the licensee and the elasticity of the transaction 
cost schedule is characterized by the parameter   . Thus, the total sunk (fixed) cost for firm   can be 
written as: 
                        
 
  
Firm   can enter products into some subset   of all possible submarkets. A product in submarket  , 
  ,  is  defined  by  a  production  technology  in  submarket   ,             ,  over  a  firm‟s  set  of 
capabilities                       .  Therefore, the firm‟s profit function can be written as  
          
   
            
where                         is licensing revenue for firm   as a function of R&D competence along 
each  trajectory     and  summed  over  all  competitor  firms  that  choose  to  license  from  firm   . 
Generally, we assume that firms will first set the total revenue for licensing they receive along each 
trajectory and then choose the number of licenses they issue to competitors. 
 
B.  Equilibrium Configuration Conditions 
Preliminary results on equilibrium conditions  , comparable to those derived by Sutton (1998, 2008) 
for his “capabilities” model, can be derived for a “capabilities” model with technology licensing with 
total market size  . The stability conditions, or “(no) arbitrage principle”, imply that an entrant firm 26 
 
can neither profitably enter solely by outspending their competitors nor by only acquiring minimal 
levels of capability via licensing without any of their own expenditure in R&D. The first condition, 
equivalent  to  Sutton‟s  “stability  condition”,  implies  that  a  high-spending  entrant  escalating  the 
current maximum expenditure     by a factor of   cannot profitably enter with capability      without 
licensing. Condition       can be written as: 
                        
          
 
                            
       
The second condition implies that, for any equilibrium condition     in which an incumbent firm is 
willing to license its technology, a high-spending entrant cannot profitably enter by recouping its 
increased R&D expenditure solely via licensing. This condition eliminates the possibility of arbitrage 
by potential entrants via licensing arrangements in the technology market, but does not preclude a 
market-leading incumbent firm from successfully licensing its technology. The second condition can 
thus be written: 
                                     
          
 
                 
 
                         
       
The final stability condition implies that, for any equilibrium condition     , a low-spending entrant 
cannot profitably enter by acquiring a minimum-level of capability solely via licensing without also 
incurring any of their own R&D expenditure. This condition arises implicitly from our assumption 
that firms are able to only license their technology or competence imperfectly such that a license 
over the minimum competency would results in a realized competency less than the minimum. 
Condition       can be written as: 
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The viability conditions, or “survivor principle”, imply that firms are able to recover their sunk cost 
outlays  in  both  R&D  expenditure  and  licensing  for  any  sustainable  equilibrium  configuration. 
Condition      , equivalent to Sutton‟s “viability condition”, implies that any equilibrium condition 
  must be such that each firm‟s final stage profit must cover its fixed outlay in the absence of 
licensing: 
                      
                                    
       
The second viability condition implies that, for any equilibrium condition   , a firm that licenses its 
technology (capability) to others must have final stage profits that cover its R&D expenditures. If 
this condition did not hold, firms would otherwise choose a different configuration of capabilities or 
would not license its technology to competitors. Condition       can thus be written as: 
                                 
                                                
       
The final viability condition implies that, for any equilibrium condition    , a firm that licenses its 
technology  (capability)  from  other  must  have  final  stage  profits  that  cover  its  fixed  outlays  in 
licensing. Thus, a firm that only licenses its capability from other firms must still have non-negative 
profits in equilibrium, a condition such that: 
                           
  
 
                                         
       
Equilibrium configuration conditions can be obtained from combining each of the corresponding 
viability  and  stability  conditions.  Thus,  the  condition  proposed  by  Sutton  is  such  that  any 
equilibrium configuration   without licensing must satisfy: 
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Combining  conditions         and         obtains  a  “Licensor  Condition”  that  limits  the 
compensation  that  firms  that  increase  R&D  expenditure  are  able  to  receive  via  licensing  to 
competitors. Thus, for any equilibrium licensing configuration    , a firm that licenses its technology 
must satisfy: 
             
 
                
    
                                 
Finally, combining conditions ( ) and ( ) obtains a “Licensee Condition” that implies that, for any 
equilibrium configuration    , there is a limit to the amount that a firm that enters solely via licensing 
can profitably increase their capabilities such that: 
                                                       
 
C.  Non-convergence and Licensing 
The proofs covering this section are not yet complete. However, preliminary results imply that 
allowing firms the ability to license their technology/capability greatly increases the set of feasible 
outcomes  that  will  be  observed  in  equilibrium.  Moreover,  the  bound  to  concentration  under 
licensing will be lower as the market leader will find it profitable to permit a greater number of 
competitors to enter the market with its technology. This result follows intuitively as we relax certain 
assumptions upon the general framework. The assumptions that we relax include the existence of 
economies of scope within firms, complementarities across goods in the product market, and a 
reduction in the transactions costs associated with licensing. 
The existence of complementary intellectual assets has been shown to be a characteristic of the 
agricultural  biotechnology  sector.  (Graff,  Rausser,  and  Small,  2003)  These  complementary 
intellectual assets can be captured by allowing for economies of scope across capabilities and our 
licensing framework extends the methods by which firms can acquire these complementary assets. 29 
 
By  allowing  for  licensing  and  cross-licensing  of  technologies,  industries  can  become  more 
consolidated without drastically increasing the levels of concentration as smaller research labs are 
able to capitalize on their own R&D expenditure via licensing of their technology. 
Secondly,  the  development  of  specific  genetic  traits  in  regards  to  nutritional  content,  yield, 
herbicide-, pesticide-, and/or fungicide-resistance opens the possibility of complementarities in the 
product market between an herbicide-resistant strain of germoplasm and a specific herbicide. If 
there are complementarities between consumer products, then firms across historically-segmented 
markets, such as the chemical industry and germoplasm producers, may find it more profitable to 
consolidate via licensing of a specific technology compared to a more costly integration of firms via 
mergers or acquisitions. Finally, as a clearer definition of property rights over genetic material in 
agricultural biotechnology has reduced the transactions costs associated with licensing of technology. 
A reduction in licensing-related transactions costs makes consolidation via licensing feasible in more 
circumstances as these costs become relatively less compared to the fixed costs associated with 
increasing capability via own R&D. We illustrate this change in feasible equilibrium configurations 
graphically in Figure 6 below: 
 30 
 
If fixed costs in an industry are exogenous, then the lower bound on industry concentration       
 
  
converges  to  zero  as  market  size  and  the  number  of  firms  in  the  industry  become  large.  The 
presence of endogenous sunk costs in the model creates a lower bound to industry concentration    
which is a function of degree of substitutability (complementarity) on the demand side, economies 
of scope on the supply side, and the parameter on the elasticity of the R&D cost function. 
Sutton‟s stability condition, condition (i) in graph and       in model, implies that for   to 
constitute an equilibrium configuration of capabilities, an existing firm (or potential entrant) cannot 
profitably enter by escalating the „maximum‟ level of some capability     by some positive value  . 
Sutton refers to it as an “arbitrage principle” by positing that within an equilibrium configuration, all 
profitable  opportunities  along  possible  research  trajectories  will  be  exhausted.  Profits  from 
escalating are less than or equal to sunk costs associated with escalation of capability. 
Sutton‟s viability condition, condition (ii) in graph and       in model, implies that for   to 
constitute an equilibrium configuration of capabilities, firms that are active in equilibrium earn non-
negative profits. Sutton refers to this as the “survivorship principle” as firms who fail this condition 
will  exit  from  the  industry.  Profits  in  equilibrium  from  producing  „maximum‟  level  of  some 
capability are greater than or equal to the sunk costs associated with achieving that capability. Jointly, 
Sutton‟s viability and stability conditions imply that the stability condition intersects the viability 
condition and provides a lower bound on industry concentration as market size increases. 
The licensing stability condition, condition (iii) in the graph and       in model, implies that 
for        to  constitute  an  equilibrium configuration of capabilities under licensing, an existing firm (or 
potential entrant) cannot escalate the level of capability and fully recoup the difference in profits by 
licensing this capability to other firms. The interpretation of the viability condition, condition (iv) in 
graph and       in model, is equivalent to the interpretation of Sutton‟s condition with the addition of the 31 
 
ability of firms to also earn additional revenue via licensing to other firms. Jointly, conditions (iii) and (iv) 
also imply that the stability condition under licensing intersects the viability condition, but that the lower 
bound on industry concentration is less than the case in which firms are unable to license. 
The result under licensing holds under well-defined property rights as firms are now able to 
license their capability to competitors and receive compensation equivalent to the profits dissipated 
from  licensing  without  the  fear  that  the  capability  can  be  appropriated  without  compensation. 
Moreover, firms that choose to license a capability (and incur the transactions costs and license 
expenditure) can do so profitably if there are economies of scope across capabilities within a firm 
(i.e. within firm spillovers)   , if there are demand-side complementarities between differentiated 
products            , or if a firm has a cost advantage in incurring additional R&D expenditure  . 
This is illustrated graphically as a rightward shift in both the stability and viability conditions such 
that a greater number of firms exist for a given equilibrium configuration. The stability condition 
now crosses Sutton‟s stability condition such that there are some cases under which an equilibrium 
configuration exists solely under Sutton‟s conditions as well as cases in which feasible equilibrium 
configurations exist only under licensing. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
The agricultural biotechnology sector has been characterized by rapid innovation, market consolidation, and a 
more exhaustive definition of property rights over the past 30 years. In their review of the literature on the 
market  structure  in  agricultural  biotechnology,  Fulton  and  Giannakas  (2001)  find  that  the  sector  has 
undergone a restructuring in the form of both horizontal and vertical integration over the past ten years. The 
industry attributes consistently identified by the literature and that factor into the analysis here include: (i) 
endogenous sunk costs in the form of expenditures on R&D that may create economies of scale and scope 
within firms; (ii) seed and agricultural chemical technologies that potentially act as complements within firms 
and substitutes across firms; and (iii) property rights governing plant and seed varieties that have become 32 
 
more clearly defined since the 1970s. We address these considerations in developing a theoretical model of 
endogenous sunk costs, licensing, and market structure in the presence of well-defined property rights. 
The research presented here extends the “capabilities” approach developed by Sutton (    ;     ; 
1998; 2008) along three dimensions: allowing firms to consolidate via licensing arrangements and not solely 
via  mergers  and  acquisitions;  incorporating  economies  of  scale  within  firms  across  capabilities;  and 
complementarities in the product market. Simulation results from a Cournot duopoly quantity-quality choice 
framework and a linear demand function with quality indices imply that licensing is (weakly) preferred by low-
cost incumbent firms, potential entrant firms regardless of their fixed cost schedule for R&D expenditure, as 
well as consumers that receive a level of quality that is greater under licensing compared to the cases where 
licensing is not feasible. 
Additionally,  we  incorporate  the  ability  of  firms  to  license  technology  into  the  theoretical 
“capabilities” model and specify the necessary conditions on configurations of goods in equilibrium. The first 
additional condition on equilibrium configurations is of primary importance here as it suggests that the ability 
of firms to license their technology will decrease the lower bound to concentration in an industry. This is not 
to  imply  that  licensing  agreements  are  unprofitable;  the  construction  of  the  model  requires  that  any 
undertaken action is inherently profitable or at the very least does not diminish profit. It does imply that in 
some circumstances, license arrangements do not necessarily lead to an increase in concentration. 
The results indicate that following the technological innovations and opening of markets in the 
    s, the sector did appear to be characterized by Sutton‟s model, but that the theoretical model allowing for 
licensing cannot be ruled out as a candidate model. Additionally, casual observation of the industry would 
suggest the latter as firms appear to have realized the most profitable synergies between seed and chemical 
manufacturers first in the form of costly mergers and acquisitions. As the profitable opportunities diminished, 
firms  seem  to  have  become  more  likely  to  engage  in  less  costly  licensing  agreements  over  specific 
technologies  more  frequently.  However,  this  leaves  open  the  chance  that  future  exogenous  shocks  to 
technology or to the size of the market could lead to additional entry, exit, and consolidation once again 
within the industry. 33 
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Figure B.4: Profits under Symmetric High Costs
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